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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The result is the same: "aid" imputes no knowledge; "aiding," un-
modified, is not criminal, regardless of what the statute says; to be
criminal, "aid" must include knowledge of the wrongful purpose of
the perpetrator.
A third solution, the simplest and the most direct, is to refuse to
be influenced by the dictum in the Hinkley case.
TIMOTHY R. CLIFFoRD
DAMAGES
Damages for Mental Suffering Resulting from Breach of Con-
tract. In Carpenter v. Moore' an unusual aspect of the law of contract
damages was re-examined by the Washington Supreme Court. Since
the emergence of Hadley v. Baxendale,2 the rule has been that dam-
ages are allowed for only those injuries that the defendant had reason
to foresee as a probable result of his breach at the time the contract
was made. One of the postulates to evolve from the Hadley rule was
that in breach of contract actions, damages for mental suffering are
not allowable.' The issue raised in the Carpenter case was whether
this aforementioned postulate ought to be followed strictly, or whether
to allow exceptions in certain cases involving contracts of such nature
that it was foreseeable at the time the contract was made that mental
anguish would result from a breach of such contract.
The controversy in the Carpenter case arose in the following man-
ner: The defendant, a dentist, agreed to make partial plates for the
plaintiff, and he expressly guaranteed that all of the work would be
done to her satisfaction. The agreed price for the plates was four
hundred dollars. The plates did not fit the plaintiff's mouth properly,
causing her pain and discomfort. They also caused growths to appear
that had to be removed by a surgeon. The plaintiff sued on grounds
of malpractice but failed to prove negligence on the part of the
dentist. The trial court allowed the pleadings to be amended to an
action for breach of contract. Judgment for the plaintiff included
four hundred dollars as the price paid for the partial plates and seven
hundred and fifty dollars for plain and suffering. On appeal the
judgment was modified, deleting the damages for pain and suffering.
It may first be observed that the Carpenter case did not present the
1 51 Wn.2d 795, 322 P.2d 125 (1958).
2 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
A Robinson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 24 Ky.L.Rep. 452, 68 S.W. 656 (1902);
Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
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usual obstacle to recovering damages for mental suffering in tort cases,
namely the lack of an accompanying physical injury." There was such
physical injury in the case at hand, as evidenced by the growths in
plaintiff's mouth.' Hence, the precise issue to be decided was whether
damages should be allowed for mental suffering resulting from a
breach of contract which also caused physical injury to the plaintiff.
The Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc, delivered the
Carpenter case opinion through Chief Justice Hill. After discussing
the requirement of foreseeability, the court said that damages for
pain and suffering are ordinarily predicated on negligence and are
not within the contemplation of the parties for the breach of a promise
to do work to the satisfaction of a patient. As authority for the latter
statement, a New York case, Frankel v. Wolper,6 was cited. The
Frankel case is questionable authority for the view expressed by the
court. In the first place, it may be distinguished from the case at hand
because it involved a physician who was negligent. The only reason
the plaintiff failed to sue for malpractice was the bar of the statute
of limitations. Judge Hill himself admitted, "Had the breach of
contract involved.., negligence ... it might well be argued that the
pain and suffering resulting therefrom were within the contempla-
tion of the parties." Moreover, thirteen years later, in a decision the
facts of which much more closely correspond with the Carpenter case,
this same New York court granted damages for pain and disfigure-
ment solely on the theory of breach of contract. This decision, which
appears to have emasculated the Frankel case to the point that it is
merely authority for determining whether a cause of action sounds
in tort or contract, stated that the Frankel case should be restricted
to controversies concerning the "classification of a particular plead-
ing so as to determine which statute of limitations was technically
applicable." I
4Where the defendant's negligence in a tort action inflicts an immediate physical
injury, the courts will generally allow compensation for purely mental elements of
damage accompanying it. Redick v. Peterson, 99 Wash. 368, 169 Pac. 804 (1918).
This requirement of physical injury is not sensible and has received criticism. PRossER,
TORTS § 177 (2nd ed. 1955).
r It would be expected that this evidence of physical injury would be helpful to the
plaintiff for two reasons: First, to prevent the court from denying damages as a result
of confusing this action for breach of contract with the aforementioned tort require-
ment of simultaneous physical injury; second, that mental suffering has been regarded
by the courts as the usual accompaniment of physical pain. Hargis v. Knoxville Power
Co., 175 N.C. 31, 94 S.E. 702 (1917). Hence, the difficulty of distinguishing between
the tvo has been deemed a reason in itself for allowing damages for mental suffering.
Bonelli v. Branciere, 127 Miss. 556, 90 So. 245 (1922).
6 181 App. Div. 485, 169 N.Y.S. 15 (1918).
7Frank v. Maliniak, 232 App. Div. 278, 249 N.Y.S. 514 (1931).
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The decision of the court in the Carpenter case was not unanimous.
Judge Finley wrote a vigorous dissent, rebutting that portion of the
opinion which refused compensation for pain and suffering with the
contention that this was another example of the common-law forms
of action "ruling us from their graves." He stated the general require-
ment of foreseeability with respect to damages for breach of contract,
and then made the following distinction as to types of contracts:
In the ordinary contract situation, only pecuniary benefits are contem-
plated by the parties; therefore, the damages resulting from the breach
of the contract are measured by pecuniary standards. But when the
parties contract for other than pecuniary benefits, other than pecuniary
standards will be applied to ascertain the damages flowing from the
breach."
Applying this distinction to the facts in the principal case, Judge
Finley reasoned that where a dentist has contracted to make and fit
dentures to the satisfaction of a patient, pain and suffering ought to
have been within the contemplation of the parties when the contract
was made.
The dissenting opinion's distinction of pecuniary and non-pecu-
niary type contracts seems to have the approval of many writers9 and
has been employed in several recent decisions involving the issue of
damages for mental suffering."0 Logically it would seem that this dis-
tinction could not be denied. Moreover, since the majority in the case
under examination did not expressly make such a denial, perhaps the
real controversy between the majority and dissent is only whether the
distinction can apply to this particular contract. Probably a good
argument can be made that it should not. The contract in the Car-
penter case would seem to fall midway between those contracts of a
purely commercial character" and contracts whose breach obviously
must result in mental anguish and pain." If the defendant in this
s Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wn.2d 795, 809, 322 P.2d 125, 133 (1958).9 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES § 328 (4th ed. 1916); McCoRuicK, DAMAGES § 592(1935); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 341 (1932).
10 Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957) (damages granted);
Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949) (damages granted) ; Farmers
Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404 (1957) (damages denied).
11 Of course the breach of even a purely commercial contract may in fact cause
considerable mental anguish. However, the courts state that such injury is a part of
the ordinary business risk and recovery for such damages was not contemplated by the
parties. Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957).
12 The American Law Institute lists the following as the most common contracts of
this kind: contracts to marry, contracts of carriers and innkeepers with passengers
and guests, contracts for the carriage or proper disposition of dead bodies, and con-




case had been a "painless" dentist who promised he would extract
teeth without discomfort to the patient, then it patently would have
been foreseeable that the defendant's breach of promise would result
in pain. Other examples of contracts whose breach did cause fore-
seeable mental anguish, and where in fact the court did grant damages
for such anguish, are: An undertaker who contracted to bury the
body in a decent, respectable manner;" an undertaker who contracted
to furnish a completely watertight vault;" a physician who agreed to
perform Caesarean section, his failure to so perform resulting in the
child being stillborn; 5 and a plastic surgeon who promised not to
make any external incisions."
In the case at hand, it must be noted that the Washington court
only modified the judgment, the amount for the price paid on the
contract still being allowed as "damages." Since no negligence or
incompetence by the defendant was found, the breach of contract
had to be predicated upon the guarantee that all the work would be
done to the plaintiff's satisfaction. To find a breach of contract on
this condition of personal satisfaction, the court necessarily must have
interpreted the contract as meaning the plaintiff's promise to pay was
conditional on the plaintiff being personally satisfied with the dentist's
performance.' This is in contrast to the more common interpretation
that the performance need only be sufficient to satisfy a reasonable
man in the promisor's position." In other words the promisor's sub-
jective state of mind was the standard, rather than the usual objective
standard. Hence, in the Carpenter case it would seem that the contract
gave the plaintiff grounds to sue on a breach for the mere reason that
the dental plates did not personally satisfy or please her. Under this
analysis, conduct of the defendant necessary to establish a breach of
contract did not necessarily have to result in pain and suffering to the
plaintiff. Thus, one can argue that the contract in the Carpenter case
was not such an instrument that pain and suffering were a foreseeable
consequence of its breach. Indeed upon considering the nature of
13 Wright v. Beardsley, 46 Wash. 16, 89 Pac. 172 (1907).
1. Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949).
15 Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957).
10 Frank v. Maliniak, 232 App. Div. 278, 249 N.Y.S. 514 (1931).
"7 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 265 (1932); Aymar v. Bloomingdale, 157 N.Y.S.
837 (1916) ; McDougall v. O'Connell, 72 Wash. 349, 130 Pac. 362 (1913). The plain-
tiff in the Aymar case paid for certain dental work under a promise by the defendant
to return his money if the plaintiff were "dissatisfied." The court held the mere fact
that the plaintiff went to a second dentist to have the defendant's work removed was
sufficient evidence of dissatisfaction.
'l Gould v. McCormick, 75 Wash. 61, 134 Pac. 676 (1913) ; Yarno v. Hedlund Box
& Lumber Co., 129 Wash. 457, 225 Pac. 659 (1924).
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most dental advertising, with its emphasis on "appearance" and the
"natural look," it seems at least possible that both dentist and patient
did in fact consider the contract in the sense of the obligation it placed
on the dentist to guarantee against mere personal disatisfaction,
rather than pain and mental anguish. This is especially persuasive
in the light of the highly successful and standardized techniques
employed by dentists today.
If the preceding analysis is correct, then the Carpenter case facts
did not really present a situation of foreseeable pain and suffering.
And perhaps that is all that the opinion actually holds. If so, the
opinion has not precluded damages for mental anguish resulting from
the breach of a contract whose subject matter would in fact make an
injury foreseeable.19 However, the words of the opinion give little
indication that the court considered such a possibility. It remains to
be seen whether a sufficiently difficult fact situation will persuade
the Washington court to narrow the Carpenter case to its own par-
ticular facts.
Although it was not referred to in either the majority or dissenting
opinions, the Carpenter case may have overruled Mullins v. Alveolar
Dental Co.2" The facts of that case were almost identical with those
of the Carpenter case, involving a dentist who contracted to make
dental plates for the plaintiff and guaranteed the work to be satisfac-
tory and to give satisfaction during the life of the patient. The dental
plates became loose, causing pain and inflammation in the plaintiff's
gums. The issue of negligence was not raised by either party, and the
trial court made no such findings. The Washington Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court awarding $280.00 to the
plaintiff for the contract price, plus $70.00 for pain and suffering.
Neither the court's opinion nor the briefs of counsel in the Mullins
case discusses the issue of whether the damages for pain and suffering
were proper.
In conclusion, the Carpenter case appears to have established the
"rule" that when a contract is breached without negligence or wan-
tonness, resulting in physical injury and pain to the plaintiff, damages
for mental suffering cannot be recovered." However, as this Note has
11 Such a fact pattern may occur where the contract is personal in nature and the
contractual duty is so coupled with matters of mental concern or with the sensibilities
of the party to whom the duty is owed. Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d
810 (1949) ; cf. Warner v. Benham, 126 Wash. 393, 218 Pac. 260 (1923).
20 97 Wash. 170, 166 Pac. 65 (1917).
21 The position taken by the Washington court with respect to allowing damages
for mental suffering for the breach of a contract of such nature that such an injury
[VOL. 34
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attempted to show, the true reason for the denial of damages in this
case may well have been simply that the mental suffering was not a
foreseeable consequence of the breach of contract. Hence the possi-
bility remains open that the above "rule" is actually conditioned on the
absence of the Hadley foreseeability requirement. If this is correct,
then the Washington court might be expected to allow damages for
mental suffering under the proper facts.
DONALD P. LEHNE
Expenses for Unsuccessful Attempt to Mitigate Damages. Snowflake Laundry Co.
v. MacDowell, 152 Wash. Dec. 591, 328 P.2d 684 (1958). P and Q were Seattle laun-
dries. P had a contract with D, whereby D was to pick up and deliver laundry on
Bainbridge Island for P. D was bound to deliver all the laundry to P, except for cer-
tain customers of Q with whom D had an agreement to service as an agent of Q.
D breached his contract with P and began diverting P's customers to Q. Upon discov-
ering this, P made efforts to establish his own laundry route on the island, spending
considerable money in the effort. In P's suit for breach of contract, the trial court
gave judgment against D, including in the damages the expenses incurred by P in
attempting to establish the new laundry route.
On appeal the supreme court observed that the doctrine of avoidable consequences
places the prospective plaintiff under a disability to recover for loss which he could
have avoided by taking reasonable steps to minimize the injury caused by the defend-
ant. This doctrine is most commonly applied to instances where the plaintiff fails to
perform these reasonable steps, thus resulting in a reduction of "damages." The
Washington court then stated that in the converse situation, where the injured party
makes reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to minimize his loss, he will be allowed to
increase his "damages" by an amount equal to the expense he incurred in the attempt
to mitigate damages. Apparently this is the first time this rule, sometimes termed the
"affirmative branch" of the doctrine of avoidable consequences, has been recognized
by the court. This rule is a logical and desirable corollary to the mitigation of damages
concept, and appears to have been uniformly accepted by other American courts when-
ever the issue was presented. Vining v. Smith, 213 Miss. 850, 58 So.2d 34 (1952) ; 25
C.J.S., Damages, § 49; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 919 (1939).
However, the Washington court held that in order for the rule to apply, the expendi-
ture must have been incurred in an effort to accomplish a result that would actually
mitigate. Hence in the case at hand, P's conduct did not meet this test and therefore
was a foreseeable consequence of the breach, with respect to fact patterns different
from the Carpenter case, is as follows:
Where the defendant willfully and wantonly breaches the contract, resulting in
mental anguish though no physical injury to the plaintiff, damages for mental suffering
can be recovered. Wright v. Beardsley, 46 Wash. 16, 89 Pac. 172 (1907). However in
a later case the Washington court indicated its reluctance to grant such damages in
this situation unless the requirements of willfulness and wantonness were clearly estab-
lished. Corcoran v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 80 Wash. 570, 142 Pac. 29 (1914).
Where the defendant is merely negligent in breaching the contract, resulting in
mental anguish though no physical injury to the plaintiff, damages for mental suffering
cannot be recovered. Kneass v. Cremation Soc. of Washington, 103 Wash. 521, 175
Pac. 172 (1918).
Where the defendant negligently breaches the contract, resulting in physical injury
and pain to the plaintiff, damages for mental suffering can be recovered. Reeves v.
Wilson, 105 Wash. 318, 177 Pac. 825 (1919).
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the court modified the judgment to reduce damages. This decision was predicated on
the reasoning that D was an independent contractor, and therefore P had no cus-
tomers on the island, but only a contract with D to have laundry delivered to P.
Hence, P's attempt to establish his own laundry route was not an attempt to mitigate
damages by an act designed to prevent the loss of his existing customers. On the
contrary, P's acts were designed to gain customers of his own, 5omething he did not
have in the first place. Thus P's expenses were not incurred in the attempt to mitigate
damages caused by D's breach.
In conclusion, while the rule allowing damages for expenses incurred in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to mitigate injury could not be applied in the Snowflake case, the case
does provide dictum that the Washington court will employ this rule if the facts are
appropriate.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Property Settlement Agreements-Contempt-Imprisonment for
Debt. In Decker v. Decker' the Washington court held that an order
in a divorce decree directing the husband to pay a debt secured by
a mortgage on real property awarded to the wife was enforceable by
contempt proceedings. The husband had promised to pay the debt
in a property settlement agreement entered into between himself and
his wife, and this provision of the agreement was incorporated in the
divorce decree. Upon the husband's failure to perform as ordered,
the wife instituted contempt proceedings to enforce the decree. The
trial court quashed the contempt proceedings upon the ground that
property settlement agreements may not be enforced in such a manner.
On appeal the respondent husband contended that enforcement of
a property settlement agreement by a contempt citation would violate
the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt." The
supreme court held that this constitutional prohibition applies only
to "run-of-the-mill debtor-creditor relationships arising, to some
extent, out of tort claims, but principally, out of matters basically
contractual in nature," in which cases "the judgment of the court is
merely a declaration of an amount owing and is not an order to pay." I
In contradistinction, the court declared that orders to pay alimony,
support, or property settlement agreements incorporated in a divorce
decree are enforceable by contempt poceedings, since the duty en-
forced is created by order of the court, and not by a debtor-creditor
relationship.
The respondent further contended that, even if a court constitu-
152 Wn.2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958).
2 WASH. CONST. Art. I, § 17.
3 Decker v. Decker, 52 Wn.2d 456, 458, 326 P.2d 332, 333 (1958).
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